owners had to seek prior coordination, adhere to Iranian routing instructions, and accept heightened risks. Some reports mentioned potential transit fees (including proposals for up to $2 million per vessel, with at least two ships reportedly paying in yuan). The system allowed Iran to project control while avoiding total isolation from key partners like China and India.
Operational Reality and Traffic Collapse
Despite the diplomatic signals, commercial traffic never recovered to normal levels. The UKMTO’s Joint Maritime Information Center repeatedly warned of “active kinetic hazard conditions,” urging extreme caution amid risks of attacks, potential mines, and GNSS interference. Historical daily transits averaged about 138 vessels. In early March, confirmed commercial movements dropped to as low as 4–7 per 24 hours. Even after a fragile US-Iran ceasefire took hold around early April, traffic remained severely depressed—often 3–11 vessels daily through mid-April, well below 10% of pre-conflict volumes.
Hundreds of tankers lingered inside the Gulf, waiting for clarity. Analysts from Kpler and Vortexa noted that safe passage could not be guaranteed, as decisions hinged on real-time military approvals, insurance costs, crew safety, and shifting political signals. Most recent transits involved Iran-linked vessels, limited bulk carriers, containers, and a handful of tankers (including some Iraqi crude resuming limited flows and Chinese supertankers exiting). Inbound traffic stayed minimal.
The economic stakes remain enormous. The strait normally carries nearly 15–21 million barrels per day of crude—roughly 20–34% of global seaborne oil trade—plus significant LNG and other commodities. Disruptions contributed to stranded volumes, elevated prices, and rerouting via pipelines like Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu and the UAE’s Fujairah where feasible.
Current Standing and Outlook
