Iran’s selective control over the Strait of Hormuz began as a sharp political response to the late February 2026 strikes but quickly evolved into a more flexible, permission-based system shaped by diplomacy, economic pressure, and operational realities.
Following the initial US-Israeli actions against Iran, Tehran asserted sovereignty over the critical waterway. On March 26-27, Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi announced that ships from “friendly nations”—specifically China, Russia, India, Iraq, and Pakistan—would receive safe passage. Iran framed the move as denying “innocent passage” rights to the United States, Israel, and their direct allies involved in the aggression, while allowing non-hostile vessels to transit after coordination with Iranian armed forces, often via the northern corridor near Larak and Qeshm islands.
The announcement created a clear initial narrative: Iran was dividing global shipping along political lines. Friendly states useful for energy imports, diplomacy, or wartime neutrality gained access, while adversaries faced exclusion. This aligned with a letter Iran sent to the International Maritime Organization emphasizing that only vessels neither participating in nor supporting aggression against Iran could proceed under regulated conditions.
Yet the policy proved less rigid than the headline suggested. Within days, exemptions expanded. Iraq secured broader clearance for its oil exports after negotiations. Ships carrying essential goods, including fertilizers critical for Asia and Africa’s planting season, received humanitarian approvals. Additional clearances went to vessels linked to Malaysia (with multiple ships approved), Thailand, Bangladesh, Oman, France, and Japan, provided they had no evident US or Israeli connections. Even some China-linked vessels, despite early hesitation where two container ships paused despite assurances, eventually moved after quiet diplomatic pressure over crude and Qatari LNG cargoes.
